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1 Introduction
The idea that competition for foreign direct investment (FDI) results in a “race to the
bottom” in taxes is a recurrent theme of public opinion in developed countries. Bidding
contests between national governments for the footloose plants of multinational enterprises
(MNEs) tend, according to this view, to depress corporate tax revenues and inflate subsidy
payments.1 The end result is that MNEs are perceived as capturing a disproportionate
share of the benefits of FDI. During the late 1990s, these public concerns were reflected at
the policy level in the launching of initiatives by both the European Union and the OECD
to combat “harmful” tax competition (see European Commission, 1997; OECD, 1998).
Some possible causes of downward pressure on equilibrium corporate tax rates (or an up-
ward pressure on subsidy payments) are suggested by existing formal analyses of tax/subsidy
competition for FDI. These have focused on the polar cases of industry structure—perfect
competition and monopoly. Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), for example, examine the de-
termination of capital taxes and public good provision in a world of perfect competition
and small, open economies. In that situation, a rise in one country’s capital tax creates
a positive externality as capital is driven abroad, benefiting other countries as the capital
inflows result in higher tax revenues and wages. In a non-cooperative environment, national
governments fail to account for these external benefits and, consequently, set tax rates and
public good provision at inefficiently low levels. In contrast, Haufler and Wooton (1999)
focus on a tax/subsidy competition game between two potential host countries for a single
firm’s production plant. With identical potential host countries, a race to the bottom occurs
1 For example, according to the eminent British political philosopher, John Gray, “(t)ax competition
among advanced states works to drain public finances and make a welfare state unaffordable” (Gray, 1998,
p. 88). Some argue that the race to the bottom will manifest itself more broadly—such as in a scramble to
dismantle environmental protections (for an analysis of which, see Markusen et al., 1996). However, our focus
is tax/subsidy competition.
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in taxes such that the winning location pays a subsidy to the firm in equilibrium and gains
no benefit from hosting the FDI.2
However, in contrast to these theoretical perspectives, much empirical evidence suggests
neither perfect competition nor monopoly is the appropriate setting to analyze tax com-
petition for FDI. In the data, FDI intensity is generally found to be positively correlated
with measures of source- and host-country product-market concentration. Davies and Lyons
(1996, chapter 7), for example, report a correlation coefficient of +05 between indices of
the “transnationalization” within the EU of large European manufacturers and production
concentration across firms at the EU level.3 This suggests using an imperfectly competitive
environment to analyze the competition by national governments for FDI. Consequently,
we use formal, game-theoretic analysis to develop intuition on how tax/subsidy competition
works in international oligopolies and to determine how the social surplus is divided between
host countries and MNEs.
In our model, two potential host countries compete to attract the FDI of two firms,
which are entirely owned outside the host countries. By locating a plant in either country, a
firm can serve both host countries’ product markets. The two host-country governments set
their taxes/subsidies independently to maximize national social welfare. We assume that,
ceteris paribus, nations prefer local production to imports and this creates the incentive for
national governments to compete to attract the FDI. This motivation arises in our model
through the existence of trade costs which make servicing a national market cheaper with
local production than through imports. This cost difference is passed on to consumers as
2 In the Haufler and Wooton model, the competition between identical countries for the monopolist is a
standard first-price auction. Other analyses of bidding for a monopolist that produce positive subsidies in
equilibrium are Black and Hoyt (1989), King et al. (1993), Haaparanta (1996), and Menezes (2003).
3 For additional evidence, see Caves (1996, section 4.1) and UNCTAD (1997, chapter 4).
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price savings, so consumers prefer local production to imports.4
Our central result is presented in the context of a baseline, symmetric model with identical
countries. We show that, subject to the fulfilment of an intuitive condition on the fixed cost
of plants, a perfect equilibrium exists where one firm locates in each country and the countries
fully capture the firms’ profits in taxes. Our duopoly result differs strikingly from that where
two identical countries compete in taxes/subsidies for a single firm. In the latter situation,
the equilibrium subsidy equals the countries’ (common) valuation of local production over
imports and we have the familiar “race to the bottom” outcome where the winning country
is left indifferent towards hosting the plant.
In our symmetric equilibrium, it is clear that the firms will locate in different countries as
the existence of trade costs means that co-location would drive down the firms’ variable profits
and result in post-tax losses. We then investigate the conditions under which the qualitative
features of the equilibrium of our baseline model survive the introduction of differences in the
sizes of the countries. We derive a condition on the market-size asymmetry between the two
host countries under which production remains internationally dispersed and the countries
continue to set corporate taxes to extract fully the firms’ profits. If the market-size aymmetry
becomes too great, this equilibrium breaks down. When the size difference between the host
countries is sufficiently great, the larger country is able to attract both firms in equilibrium
and impose a corporate tax, despite the offer of a subsidy by the smaller country. This new
equilibrium has similar features to that derived by Haufler and Wooton (1999) for monopoly
and a large asymmetry in country size.5
4 This is not the only potential benefit that might arise from local production. For example, an MNE
may offer a wage premium over workers’ outside options, an extreme case of which occurs when inward FDI
relieves involuntary unemployment (Haaparanta, 1996; Bjorvatn and Eckel, 2006). Alternatively, the inward
FDI may be associated with localized technological spillovers to indigenous firms (Fumagalli, 2003; Olsen and
Osmundsen, 2003).
5 Ottaviano and van Ypersele (2005) also present a qualitatively identical equilibrium in a model of tax
competition between countries of different sizes under large-group monopolistic competition.
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To the best of our knowledge, Janeba (1998) is the only existing formal analysis of
tax/subsidy competition under oligopoly. However, both Janeba’s modelling set-up and the
resulting incentives are very different from ours. Like us, he considers two host countries
for FDI and two mobile firms. In his model, each country owns one of the firms, and the
government policy instrument is an output tax/subsidy, which can be interpreted as a profit
tax/subsidy. The firms compete à la Cournot on a third market through costless exports.
When firms are constrained to produce in their home countries, as in Brander and Spencer
(1985), both governments use output subsidies in equilibrium to make their national firms
more aggressive on the product market (profit-shifting). However, when the firms’ plants
are mobile, tax competition drives the countries’ output subsidies down to zero. Key to this
result is the assumption of nondiscrimination between domestic and foreign firms. Therefore,
starting from the Brander and Spencer equilibrium, each government has an incentive to cut
its output subsidy under plant mobility, thereby driving its own firm abroad where it will be
subsidized by foreign taxpayers. In contrast to our model, the incentives created by Janeba’s
set-up mean that (in the presence of output subsidies) governments do not wish to attract
inward FDI, a characteristic which seems difficult to reconcile with experience. Another
important difference is that Janeba’s “third market” assumption means that the impact of
national market-size asymmetries cannot be assessed.
We set out our model of tax competition to attract a duopoly industry in section 2. The
baseline, symmetric version of the model is solved in section 3. In section 4, we address the
question of whether this symmetry depends on the assumption of identical host countries by
allowing one of the host countries to have a larger national market. We conclude in section 5
by discussing some potential extensions to our analysis and by considering the restrictiveness
of some of the specific assumptions we have imposed.
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2 Model
We model the tax/subsidy competition between two host countries,  and , for the plants
of two identical firms. The two firms produce a homogeneous good and county  is  ≥ 1
times larger than . The national demand curves are:
 =  (− ) and  = −  (1)
where  is the market price in country . Parameter  measures the common reservation
price, and  is an index of the size advantage of country .6
Our game has three stages and complete but imperfect information.
Stage 1: Governments  and  simultaneously and irreversibly announce their tax offers,
 and .
Stage 2: The two firms simultaneously and irreversibly pick locations, choosing between
{∅ }, where ∅ is the no-entry option.
Stage 3: Firms compete à la Cournot to serve both countries’ markets.
We solve the game backwards to isolate its subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure
strategies.
From the viewpoint of the firms, the governments’ taxes are location-specific fixed costs
(corporate taxes are levied on a source basis). For  ∈ {},   0 is a lump-sum tax,
  0 represents a lump-sum subsidy, and  = 0 is laissez-faire. We assume that the
governments cannot discriminate between firms when setting taxes.7
6 These demand functions are consistent with quasi-linear preferences.
7 Firms are identical in every respect (costs, technology, ownership structure, etc.) and are assumed to
arrive simultaneously and so there is no natural basis for discrimination.
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2.1 Profits of the Firm
In addition to taxes/subsidies, firms face three types of cost, all of which are independent of
the location of production. The marginal production cost is  and a specific trade cost of
  0 applies to goods shipped between the two host countries. We further assume that if
a firm chooses ∅, it cannot serve markets  and  from a third country due to prohibitive
trade barriers.
If only one of the firms establishes a plant, then the market equilibrium is the monopoly
solution. Variable profits per head are:
∅ ≡ 1
4
(− )2  on local sales at marginal cost ;
∅ ≡ 1
4
(−  − )2  on export sales at marginal cost  +  .
Trade costs ensure that ∅  ∅. That is, local production is more profitable than serving
a market though exports.
If both firms establish plants, then the market equilibrium is given by Cournot duopoly.
Variable profits per head depend on both firms’ locations:
 ≡ 1
9
(−  + )2  if firm produces locally and its rival produces abroad;
 ≡ 1
9
(− )2  if both firms produce locally;
 ≡ 1
9
(−  − )2  if both firms produce abroad;
 ≡ 1
9
(− − 2)2  if firm produces abroad and its rival produces locally.
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
(2)
If the firms establish plants in different countries, we assume that trade cross-hauling occurs.
That is, the homogeneous good is simultaneously exported and imported. This requires that
 ≤  where the prohibitive trade cost is:
 ≡ 1
2
(−) , (3)
Condition (3) ensures that every possible Cournot equilibrium is interior. Given this trade
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cost, we know from (2) that:
      ,
 +    +  .
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎭
(4)
A firm’s total operating profits, Π , are defined as the sum of profits from serving both
markets when the firm is located in country  and its competitor is in country . We assume
that the fixed cost of a plant, , is sufficiently large to ensure that firms establish at most
one plant. For a monopolist,  = ∅ and total profits for the firm are:
Π∅ ≡ ∅ + ∅ − ,
Π∅ ≡ ∅ + ∅ − ,
With trade costs, the larger market is the more profitable plant location. That is, Π∅  Π∅
for any   1 and   0. If  = 0, then profits are independent of the location of production.
Under duopoly, the total operating profits of a firm are:
Π ≡  +  − , Π ≡  +  − ,
Π ≡  +  − , Π ≡  +  − .
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
(5)
From (4) we can determine that:
Π = Π  Π = Π, for  = 1;
Π  Π, Π  Π, for   1;
Π  Π, for  ≥ 1.
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
(6)
There are three elements to (6). Firstly, with equally sized countries, profits are higher
when production is geographically dispersed. Second, when  has a larger market than ,
regardless of whether production is to be geographically dispersed or concentrated in one
country, locating in  is more profitable than setting up in . Third, a firm located in
 benefits if its rival moves production abroad to  whatever the relative sizes of the two
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countries. However, the same cannot be said of a firm based in  as the ranking of Π
and Π is crucially sensitive to , a property that will be important for the analysis of
section 4.
Firms choose their locations independently to maximize post-tax profits. Let
∆ ≡ Π −Π (7)
be the operating profit differential (i.e. excluding tax/subsidy differences) arising from lo-
cating a plant in  rather than , when the rival firm locates in country . We call this
country ’s “geographic advantage”. From (4) and (5), we know that ∆  ∆. ∆ is
increasing in  because locating in  becomes more attractive as its market grows. However,
as ∆ may be negative, so being in  may not always be the more advantageous location.
We can determine a firm’s best response to the location choice of the other firm. Given
its rival’s choice of  ∈ {∅}, a firm has the following locational preferences:
 Â ∅ if and only if   Π ;
 Â ∅ if and only if   Π ; and
 Â  if and only if   ∆ + .
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎭
(8)
2.2 Welfare and Governments
As imports are subject to trade costs, local production benefits a country’s citizens by offering
lower prices. Consumers would be indifferent to the location of production if trade were free.
When there is a single firm in the market, the consumer surplus per head is:
∅ ≡ 1
8
(− )2 , if the monopolist produces locally; while
∅ ≡ 1
8
(−  − )2 , if the monopolist produces abroad.
Clearly, with trade costs, local production is better as ∅  ∅, creating an incentive to
attempt to attract the FDI.
8
With two firms, the locational configurations of production become more complex. Con-
sumer surplus per head under Cournot duopoly is:
 ≡ 2
9
(− )2  if both firms produce locally;
 ≡  ≡ 1
18
(2− 2 − )2  if one firm is local, other produces abroad;
 ≡ 2
9
(−  − )2  if both firms produce abroad.
These can be ranked as
   ≡    .
That is, the more firms that produce locally, the better.
We assume that goverments  and  are benevolent, both being motivated by national
social welfare, and that they set their taxes/subsidies,  and , independently. National
social welfare is defined as total consumer surplus plus tax revenues (or minus total subsidy
payments). Each government must balance its budget, only being able to redistribute income
in a lump-sum manner between its citizens and the foreign MNEs.
The MNEs are assumed to be wholly owned outside of countries  and , so their post-
tax profits do not contribute to social welfare in the host countries.8 Moreover, we assume
throughout the bulk of our analysis that the firms’ pre-tax profits are positive in all location
configurations.9
3 Baseline Case: Identical Host Countries
We now analyze the equilibrium taxes and firm locations in the case where countries  and
 are of equal size,  = 1. This symmetrical case is used to demonstrate our central result.
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
8 Ferrett and Wooton (2006) examine how changing the international distribution of a monopoly firm’s
ownership affects the outcome of the tax/subsidy competition for its FDI.
9 The exceptions to this are the existence results in part (i) of each of Proposition 1 and Proposition 3,
which place no restrictions on pretax profits.
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Figure 1 uses (8) to plot the firms’ equilibrium locations as functions of the countries’
tax offers,  and . Inter-regional boundaries are drawn in the tax space, and the firms’
equilibrium response to an offer of ( ) is indicated by [ ] where   ∈ {∅} 
As the countries are the same size, these inter-regional boundaries are symmetric around
the  =  line. Qualitatively, the relative positions of these boundaries are robust to
changes in the transport and plant costs. Reducing  cuts ∆ = −∆, the profit advantage
to locating abroad from the rival firm, because the firms’ profits vary less with their plant
locations. With free trade,  = 0, the [] region collapses into the line  = . Changing
the plant cost  alters all of the Π terms and shifts the inter-regional boundaries without
affecting their relative positions. Figure 1 is drawn for the case where pre-tax profits are
positive in every location configuration, even co-location.
Point  in Figure 1 is just below and to the left of (ΠΠ) such that the taxes being
levied on the firms are an amount  less than these values. At , the firms locate in different
countries and (almost) all of their profits are captured in tax by the host countries. We shall
call  the point of “Full Profit Extraction” (FPE) and it is our candidate for the subgame
perfect equilibrium. Suppose that firm 1 locates in . Given that  =  = Π −  at
, it is clear that firm 2’s optimal location is . As   0, the firm is (just) profitable in ,
so it will enter. Were it to choose , competition with its co-located rival would drive down
its earnings, making production unprofitable after taxes.
We now derive conditions for the FPE point  to be a bidding equilibrium. As the
countries are assumed to be the same size, the model is symmetric. Therefore we focus on
country ’s choice of  given that  = Π. By varying , there are three distinct
location equilibria that  can induce: [], [], and [∅]. For any given location
equilibrium where it attracts at least one firm, ’s optimal  will be as big as possible.
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Consumer surplus is determined solely by the location of the firms and is unaffected by 
and therefore the government will want to set the highest tax, conditional on  inducing
the desired location outcome. Therefore,  will never deviate from  to another point in
[], and if it deviates to [], it will optimally set  = Π − .
In order to rule out tax-cutting from point , we need ’s social welfare at  to be at
least as great as that just inside [], which means that:
 +Π ≥  + 2Π (9)
Expanding the profit terms, and rearranging, this yields a lower limit on a firm’s fixed costs
such that  ≥ , where
 ≡  −  + 2 ( +  )− ( + )  (10)
The easiest way to think of country ’s taxation incentives when  is set to fully extract
profits is that  reimburses the fixed plant costs  of the firms it attracts and then completely
taxes away their variable profits. Therefore,  acts like the “price” of a firm. (10) requires
that  exceed the marginal benefit to  of a second firm, which is the gain in consumer
surplus plus the rise in taxable variable profts resulting from having both firms.
We must also rule out tax-raising by government . This requires that ’s social welfare
at  be at least as great as that in [∅]:
 +Π ≥ ∅ (11)
This corresponds to determining an upper limit on fixed costs such that  ≤ , where
 ≡  − ∅ + ( + )  (12)
By raising its tax from point , country  induces a location equilibrium of [∅]. That is,
it drives the local firm out of the industry altogether. To preclude this, we require that the
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firm “price”  lie below the marginal benefit of the first firm, given in (12). Straightforward
algebra shows that    for all nonprohibitive trade costs,  ≤  .
Proposition 1 gives our baseline existence result:
Proposition 1 (existence of dispersed equilibrium with FPE)
Assume that the countries are of equal size ( = 1).
(i) A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium characterized by internationally dispersed produc-
tion and corporate taxes that fully extract profits (i.e. at point  in Figure 1) exists
if and only if the plant fixed cost  lies within £¤, where  and  are defined in
(10) and (12), respectively.
(ii) The interval
£¤ is non-empty on all nonprohibitive  .
(iii) If we additionally assume that pre-tax profits are positive in all location configurations,
then a dispersed equilibrium with FPE exists if and only if  ∈ [  +  ]. This
interval is smaller than that in (i) and non-empty on  ∈ £49 (− )  ¤.
Parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 1 show that for any  ∈ [0  ] it is possible to set 
so that point  in Figure 1 is an equilibrium. The fact that the equilibrium at  involves
FPE is quite striking when contrasted with tax/subsidy competition to attract a monopoly
(Haufler and Wooton, 1999). With identical host countries, the monopolist locates in the
country offering the lower tax or higher subsidy. In equilibrium, the countries’ subsidy offers
are driven up to their common valuation of local production over imports, ∅ −∅. This
monopoly case is probably the simplest possible example of the “race to the bottom” where
tax/subsidy competition results in a subsidy that leaves the winning country indifferent about
hosting the monopolist’s plant. The duopoly outcome that we investigate is starkly different.
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In equilibrium at point , the firms are indifferent between entering the industry and staying
out, and corporate taxes “race to the top” to capture all the firms’ profits.
Part (iii) of Proposition 1 invokes the additional assumption that Π = Π ≥ 0. This
is sufficient (but unnecessary) to make pre-tax profits at  positive, so the equilibrium 
and  represent corporate taxes. Therefore, this assumption allows us to focus on arguably
the most empirically relevant case in which effective corporate taxes are positive (Devereux
et al., 2002). As Π ≥ 0 is a tighter restriction than  ≤  in (12), we need to recheck
for the existence of equilibrium. Remember that if   49 (−), then we can still select 
so that the FPE equilibrium exists; but pre-tax profits under co-location would be strictly
negative.10
Changing the trade cost  will alter the countries’ incentives to raise or cut taxes, and
therefore also alter the range of plant costs that support the FPE equilibrium,
£¤. For
example, in (10) it is intuitive that the consumer surplus benefit of cutting taxes, − ,
is increasing in  . However, the level of variable profits that can be extracted through tax,
2 ( +  )− ( + ), decreases with  , and this reduction outweighs the consumer
surplus gain. Therefore,  falls as  rises. Straightforward algebra can also be used to show
that  is U-shaped in  . Therefore, the interval £¤ grows in size as  approaches  .
We now consider the uniqueness of equilibrium. The assumption that pre-tax profits are
positive implies that point  lies in the NE quadrant of Figure 1.11
Proposition 2 (uniqueness of dispersed equilibrium with FPE)
If pre-tax profits are positive in all location configurations, then the FPE equilibrium de-
scribed in Proposition 1 is unique.
10 The necessary condition for positive equilibrium taxes is Π ≥ 0. This is looser than Π ≥ 0, and the
existence interval  ∈ [  + ] is nonempty on  ∈  417 (−)  

.
11 For clarity, we shall use “geographical” directions, where North (N) is oriented in the direction of .
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Proof: With pre-tax profits always positive, both firms will enter the industry in equilibrium.
Suppose, to the contrary, that in equilibrium at least one of the firms stays outside the
industry. Thus, at least one country attracts no firms. Let this empty country be .
It would benefit by cutting its tax to Π −   0 in order to attract a firm, boosting
the nation’s consumer surplus and its tax revenue.12 Therefore, both firms will be
induced to enter the industry in equilibrium. The question is whether production is
dispersed or co-located. The formal proof, in the appendix, addresses this issue.
4 Market Size Asymmetries
We now let country  be   1 times larger than . Increasing  raises the pre-tax
profits of an entrant firm regardless of its location. However, a rise in  benefits a firm
located in country  more than one located in  because the former enjoys local access
to the larger product market. In this asymmetric environment, two questions naturally
arise. First, does an equilibrium with the qualitative features of the FPE equilibrium (i.e.,
dispersed production, and zero after-tax profits) continue to exist? Second, do qualitatively
new equilibria arise, such as might involve co-location of the firms?
Throughout this section we will assume that the plant cost  is sufficiently small to
make pre-tax profits positive in all location configurations.13 This assumption has an
important implication, noted in the proof of Proposition 2 above. It means that both firms
will enter the industry in any equilibrium. Therefore, the key question is whether production
is internationally dispersed or co-located.
We first consider the conditions for a dispersed equilibrium, [], determining the
12 If the initial, putative equilibrium were [∅∅], then ’s deviation would lead to [∅]. If it were [∅],
then ’s deviation could produce either [] or [∅] (see Figure 1). The key point is that tax-cutting
means that  attracts a firm, and it may also lead to an extra entrant into the industry.
13 The sole exception to this is in the existence result in Proposition 3(i).
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equilibrium tax levels and, specifically, whether FPE will continue. Assume that the countries
set ( ) = (ΠΠ) in anticipation of dispersed production. The issue is whether,
in response to such FPE taxes, the firms choose to locate in different countries. Because
Π  Π for all  ≥ 1, it is clear that the firm in  will not deviate to join its rival in
country  With FPE taxes, the firm earns zero post-tax profits in , but would make a
post-tax loss if it moved to country . As long as Π  Π, we can apply the same logic
to rule out a move by the firm in  into country . With Π  Π, relocating from 
to  competes pre-tax profits down and leads to post-tax losses if  = Π.
However, Π  Π does not hold for all   1. Specifically:
Π  Π if and only if    ≡  −  −  =
2 (−) + 
2 (− )− 3 (13)
Therefore, if    so Π  Π, then the firms will optimally co-locate in country 
in response to FPE taxes of ( ) = (ΠΠ). This means that we can only hope
to generalize the symmetric, baseline equilibrium (i.e., dispersed production plus FPE) for
values of  ∈ (1 ].14 With   , the viability of the FPE equilibrium is destroyed by the
strong incentive for relocation that is offered by a low corporate tax in . The reason why
Π overtakes Π as  rises is as follows. If country ’s market becomes very large relative
to that of , then a firm in  would prefer its rival to locate in  as well because co-location
would cut competition and boost profits on the significantly larger product market, with the
rise in export profits outweighing the fall in domestic profits on market .
Assume that  ∈ (1 ] so that ( ) = (ΠΠ) leads to locations of []. We
now investigate when these tax rates will be an equilibrium. Clearly,   1 implies that the
countries are no longer identical, so there are two conditions to rule out tax cutting, both
analogous to (10). Country  prefers attracting one firm to cutting its tax and attracting
14 Note that  equals 1 under free trade ( = 0) and is increasing in  , reaching a maximum value of 5
when the trade barrier is prohibitive ( = ).
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both firms if and only if
 +Π ≥  + 2Π (14)
Expanding the profit terms, and rearranging, yields a lower limit on a firm’s fixed costs such
that  ≥ , where
 ≡ ( −  ) + 2 ( +  )− ( + ) (15)
The equivalent condition to rule out tax cutting by country  is
 +Π ≥  + 2Π (16)
Expanding the profit terms, and rearranging, yields a lower limit on a firm’s fixed costs such
that  ≥ , where
 ≡  −  + 2 ( +  )− ( + ) (17)
By analogy to (12), there are also two conditions to rule out tax-increasing deviations,
that would drive the local firm out of the industry. These are
 ≤  ≡  ( − ∅) + ( + ) (18)
for country  and
 ≤  ≡  − ∅ + ( + ) (19)
for country . Straightforward algebra shows that        for all   .
Proposition 3 sums up our generalization of the dispersed-production, FPE equilibrium.
Proposition 3 (dispersed equilibrium with FPE)
Assume that the size differential is sufficiently small,  ≤ , such that Π ≥ Π.
(i) A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with dispersed production and FPE exists if and
only if  ∈ £ ¤, which is a non-empty interval on all nonprohibitive  .
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(ii) If we additionally assume that pre-tax profits are positive in all location configurations,
then a dispersed equilibrium with FPE exists if and only if  ∈ £  +  ¤.
This interval is smaller than that in (i) and non-empty on  ≤ ∗ ≡ 44(−)−5 , where
∗ ∈ [0 ) for all nonprohibitive  .
Part (ii) of Proposition 3 introduces ∗, the largest size difference that is compatible with
production dispersion and FPE in equilibrium if pre-tax profits are positive. We note that
∗  1 on  ∈ ¡49 (− )  ¤. Moreover, ∗ rises with  , reaching 43 at  =  .15
Before turning to consider the conditions for a co-located equilibrium, we need to deter-
mine whether a dispersed [] equilibrium is possible when   .16 From our discussion
above, we know that such an equilibrium could not involve FPE. Moreover, it turns out that
no such equilibrium exists, for the following reasons. With   , the firms would choose
locations [] in response to ( ) = (ΠΠ). Therefore, to obtain [] as a
location equilibrium with   ,  must be below Π to stop the firm in  relocating
to . The largest  that satisfies this requirement will make the firm in  approximately
indifferent between  and , given that the other firm is in . However, in response to
that  value, country  would optimally cut  infinitesimally and attract both firms,
undermining the possibility of production dispersion in equilibrium.
We now investigate the conditions for a co-located equilibrium. Specifically, we focus
on [], the case where both firms locate in larger country .17 Let country  offer a
subsidy of  = − ( −  ), which is a corporate subsidy equal to its valuation of a single
15 As in the discussion of Proposition 1, imposing the assumption of positive equilibrium taxes would be
less demanding. To see this, note that Π ≡  +  ≥  if and only if  ≤ 4(−)+68(−)−11 , where the
right-hand side exceeds 1 if and only if  ≥ 4
17 (−) (though it remains less than ).
16 The argument in this paragraph is more fully developed in Ferrett and Wooton (2005).
17 We show in Ferrett and Wooton (2005) that co-location in country  is impossible in equilibrium.
Essentially, this is because country  has a greater willingness to subsidise inward FDI.
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plant and ensures that both firms will enter the industry (given positive pre-tax profits). In
response, country  optimally sets , effectively choosing between three location pairs,
[], [] and []. In order to attract both firms, country  will set  so that
Π −  = Π −  +  ⇒  = ∆ +  −  (20)
In order to attract just one firm, country  will set  so that
Π −  = Π −  +  ⇒  = ∆ +  −  (21)
Country ’s social welfare is:  + 2 if it hosts both firms;  +  if it hosts
just one firm; and  if it hosts neither. Therefore, a co-located equilibrium requires that
country  prefers hosting both firms with a tax of (20) to the alternatives of hosting one
firm with a tax of (21) or hosting neither firm. Formally,
 + 2 (∆ + ) ≥ max { +∆ +  }
subject to  = − ( −  ). Straightforward algebra shows that this condition holds if
 is sufficiently large.18 Country ’s willingness to pay for additional firms is derived from
the consumer-surplus benefits of inward FDI, which increase in line with , and yields our
result. Proposition 4 sums up our analysis of co-location.
Proposition 4 (co-located equilibrium)
Assume that pre-tax profits are positive in all location configurations.
(i) A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists with firm co-location in the larger country
and strictly positive post-tax profits if and only if  ≥ ∗∗ ≡ 12(−)+512(−)−17 , where
∗∗ ∈ (1 ) for all  ∈ (0 ).
18 The first argument in max {·} is the one that binds.
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(ii) Because ∗∗  ∗ on all nonprohibitive  , there is either a unique perfect equilibrium
or no equilibrium in pure strategies.
As   0, country  offers a subsidy, it is clear from (20) that post-tax profits in the
co-location equilibrium, Π − , must be positive. However, it is also the case that, for
sufficiently large ,   0 in the co-location equilibrium despite the offer of a subsidy by
. This mirrors the result in Haufler and Wooton (1999) where a large country is able to
impose a corporate tax while retaining FDI, despite the offer of a subsidy by the smaller
country. Such a tax is possible because of the superior product-market access offered by the
larger country.
5 Conclusion
Our central result concerns the outcome of the competition between two identical countries
to attract the investment of two identical firms. We show that an equilibrium exists where
production is internationally dispersed and all profits are captured in tax by the host coun-
tries. This “race to the top” contrasts strikingly with the “race to the bottom” observed in
the tax/subsidy competition between two identical countries for a monopoly firm’s plant.
We investigate the robustness of this central result to changes in the relative sizes of the
competing countries. We assume that the plant cost is small enough to make pre-tax profits
positive in all location configurations and show that this implies that both firms will enter
the industry in equilibrium. The question is whether the firms are internationally dispersed
or locate in the same country. If an equilibrium exists, it is unique. For a sufficiently small
degree of size asymmetry between the countries, the equilibrium is qualitatively identical
to that in the baseline, symmetric case in that production is dispersed and profits are fully
extracted by taxes. For a larger degree of size asymmetry, however, both firms may locate
in the larger country and earn strictly positive post-tax profits.
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Our interest lies in the outcomes of tax/subsidy competition in situations where both
firms and host countries care about production locations. Trade costs are an especially sim-
ple way of creating such an environment, as consumers would rather have (cheaper) locally
produced goods than imports, while these trade costs also mean that a firm cares about its
own location and that of its rival. However, our results are not limited to the particular
specification of the model that we have used. For example, government concerns about the
location of MNEs’ plants often appear primarily driven by the relief of involuntary unem-
ployment and the promotion of technology spillovers to indigenous firms. We argue that
these wider governmental motivations are qualitatively identical to those of our driving force
of increasing consumer surplus. In order to introduce explicitly these additional host-country
incentives, we would need to impose additional structural assumptions. These would compli-
cate the analysis without altering the qualitative results. Essentially, the simple expedient of
trade costs allows us to build the minimal model of tax/subsidy competition where location
matters to both firms and host countries.
We have imposed linearity assumptions on the cost and demand functions, and this makes
it straightforward for us to derive closed-form solutions. However, we believe that our qual-
itative results would survive with more general (but well-behaved) functional forms, given
that linearity is not a necessary part of our explanation. For example, it is the geographic
structure of our model, specifically the existence of trade costs, that underlies our central
result on the existence of equilibrium with internationally dispersed production and FPE.
Firm co-location intensifies competition and competes profits down, resulting in the firms
locating in different countries in our baseline equilibrium. Furthermore, for any cost/demand
functions, the two critical levels of the plant fixed cost  between which our baseline equilib-
rium exists will continue to be given by conditions (10) and (12). Different functional forms
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would merely alter the specific expressions for consumer surplus and per-capita profits.
A further set of possible extensions centres around altering the policy instruments avail-
able to the host countries. The assumptions we make of lump-sum taxes/subsidies, balanced
government budgets, and non-discrimination between the two firms are very simple and facil-
itate a clear analysis. In practice, of course, governments have a much richer menu of policy
instruments and options available and therefore more degrees of freedom than in our model.
An interpretation of our central result that we favour is that it demonstrates that govern-
ments do not need a large policy space in order to appropriate the entire social surplus
generated in a mobile industry. Moreover, we conjecture (following Haufler and Wooton,
1999) that our result would survive if proportional profits taxes were substituted for the
lump-sum taxes we have used.19
We might allow for more host countries and/or firms. It seems clear that the logic of our
arguments and, by extension, our qualitative results should readily generalize to many other
specifications with oligopoly in the product markets. With  countries of a “similar” size and
 firms (where  ≥  and  an integer), we anticipate the possibility of constructing an
FPE taxation equilibrium where each country hosts  firms.20 In this case, the tradeoffs
facing each country would be the same as those in our baseline model with identical countries.
Under FPE, the government effectively reimburses firms’ plant investment costs and then
taxes away of all their variable profits. Therefore, a taxation equilibrium with FPE requires
that the plant cost be neither so low that attracting additional inward FDI is affordable nor
so large that increasing corporate taxes and driving firms away is worthwhile.
19 For example, a perfect equilibrium with internationally dispersed production and a corporate tax rate
of 100 per cent on positive profits clearly exists if the plant cost  is such that pre-tax profits are strictly
positive with dispersed production but strictly negative under co-location.
20 In the 2-country, -firm oligopoly model of Haufler and Wooton (2007), there is an equilibrium in which
the governments set FPE taxes in the symmetric case and each country gets 2 of the firms. This arises
only at one critical level of trade costs because  is treated as as continuous, rather than as an integer.
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We also conjecture that the analysis of the large size-asymmetry case is generalizable
to more than two firms, but sticking with two host countries. Haufler and Wooton (2007)
investigate the effects of trade integration (the reduction in trade costs) on the level of
taxes, the location of firms, and national welfare in a setting identical to ours except for
there being a large, but fixed, number of firms in the industry. For a given size asymmetry
and at sufficiently high trade costs, a dispersed FPE equilibrium exists. Firms increasingly
aggolomerate in the larger market as trade costs decline until eventually the larger country
attracts all the firms, the smaller country posts a subsidy equal to its valuation for a single
firm, and the larger country’s tax bid just trumps its rival’s bid.
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6 Appendix: Proof of Proposition 2
We split up Figure 1 and consider each part in turn.
(i) Country  can profitably deviate from any point in [∅∅] or [∅] by setting a positive
tax of  = Π − . Through this deviation,  gains both consumer surplus and tax
revenue. Likewise, country  can profitably deviate from any point in [∅∅] or [∅]
by setting a positive tax of  = Π − .
(ii) Point  is the only possible equilibrium point in the [] region. At least one of
the countries can profitably deviate from any other point in [] by raising its tax
without upsetting the firms’ location choices.
(iii) The only possible equilibrium points in [] and [] are, respectively, along the
NW and SE boundaries as a host can profitably deviate from any other point by raising
its tax. Moreover, country  can deviate from any point along the [] boundary in
the NE and SE quadrants by cutting  and stealing a firm from . This is profitable
as it can be achieved keeping  positive. Likewise, country  can profitably deviate
from points along the [] boundary in the NE and NW quadrants by cutting .
(iv) Aside from point , the remaining possible equilibrium points lie along the boundaries
of the [] and [] regions in the SW quadrant, where the firms would co-locate.
The following condition rules out an equilibrium inside [] (and, due to symmetry,
rules out an equilibrium inside []). Given that  = − ( −  ), the maximum
subsidy country  is prepared to pay for a single firm, country  prefers hosting one
firm to both if and only if  +∆ +  ≥  + 2 (∆ + ). The left-hand side
of this inequality is ’s social welfare if it deviates to the top of the [] region.
Straightforward algebra shows that this condition holds for all nonprohibitive  .
25
T A
[B
, 
]
[
, 
]
П
[B
, B
]
[A
, 
]
E
П
AB
П
A
П
AA Δ
A
T
[A
, B
]
45
°
T B
П
BB
П
B
П
BA
Δ
B
[A
, A
]
T A
=
T B
Fi
gu
re
 1
. E
qu
ili
br
iu
m
 lo
ca
tio
ns
 w
ith
 e
qu
al
ly
 si
ze
d 
co
un
tri
es
